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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1 . Does a claim for "wrongful pregnancy" resulting
in the birth of a normal, healthy child as the result of an
unsuccessful sterilization procedure performed by a physician
give rise to a tort claim for damages under the laws of the
State of Utah?
2.

In the event a tort claim for "wrongful pregnan-

cy" is recognized by the laws of the State of Utah, what is the
appropriate measure of damages?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action for "wrongful pregnancy" and is a
case of first impression in Utah,

The plaintiff/appellant filed

an action in the United States District Court for the District
of Utah based upon the allegation that plaintiff was not given
adequate

advice by

the defendant/respondent, Norman Nielson,

M.D. (Dr. Nielson), concerning a sterilization procedure which
she claimed had caused her damage.

Dr. Nielson filed a Motion

for Summary Judgment claiming that Utah law does not allow an
action for wrongful pregnancy; and, alternatively, if such an
action is allowed, Utah law should not permit recovery of all of
the damages claimed by the plaintiff.
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The Federal Court requested the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah to exercise its discretion and answer the questions of law certified to it,

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

On March

28, 1983, defendant

Norman Nielson,

M.D. (Dr. Nielson) performed a tubal ligation procedure (a severance of the fallopian tubes for sterilization) on the plaintiff.
2.

During November of 1984, the plaintiff became

pregnant and subsequently gave birth to a normal, healthy child
on July 24, 1985.
3.
negligent

Plaintiff does not allege that Dr. Nielson was

in the manner

in which the surgical procedure was

performed; she alleges that Dr. Nielson was negligent in not
informing her that:
a.

The procedure was not "absolute in nature."

b.

Alternative

sterilization

procedures

were

available (i.e., hysterectomy) with varying success rates.
4.

Plaintiff asserts the following damage claims:

a.

Medical

expenses

incurred

pregnancy and the birth of the child;
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during

plaintiff's

b.

Medical expenses incurred in having a hys-

terectomy performed subsequent to the birth of the child;
c.

"Emotional

trauma"

during

and

after

the

pregnancy because of her concerns that the child may inherit her
psychiatric problems;

5.

d.

Pain and suffering; and

e.

Costs of "rearing an unplanned child."

Dr. Nielson filed a Motion for Summary Judgment

on the grounds that the claim for "wrongful pregnancy" as a
result of the birth of a normal, healthy child does not give
rise to a tort claim as one of the essential elements of the
tort, namely legally compensable damages is not present; alternatively, Dr. Nielson moved the Court for an Order establishing
the measure of damages which would be allowed if the claim for
"wrongful pregnancy" was legally recognized.
6.

The plaintiff resisted

Judgment and asserted

the Motion for Summary

that the claim of "wrongful pregnancy"

should be recognized by the laws of the State of Utah and that
all of the items of claimed damages set forth above should be
recognized.
7.

The

case

was

scheduled

for

trial

commencing

January 14, 1987; the trial date has been vacated by the Court
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pending the action of the Utah Supreme Court on this Order of
Certification.

(Order of Certification

to the Utah Supreme

Court, KIV.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The plaintiff1s claim for wrongful pregnancy is barred
by the provisions of §78-11-23 to 25, U.C.A., which has been
referred to as the "Wrongful Life Act".
An action in tort for damages for wrongful pregnancy
should not be allowed where parents give birth to a normal,
healthy child, as they have suffered no "legally compensable
damage."
Alternatively, should plaintiff's claim for wrongful
pregnancy be recognized, Utah should adopt a rule which only
allows damages associated with the pregnancy and child birth and
does

not

allow

damages

for

the costs of rearing

a normal,

healthy child.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS BARRED
BY THE WRONGFUL LIFE ACT
The Wrongful Life Act (the Act) provides in relevant
part as follows:
-4-

"§78-11-23. Right to life — state policy.
The legislature finds and declares it is
the public policy of this state to encourage all persons to respect right of life
and all other persons, regardless of age,
development, condition
of
dependency,
including all handicapped persons and all
unborn persons.
§78-11-25. Failure or refusal to prevent
birth not a defense.
The failure... to
prevent the live birth of a person...shall
not be considered in awarding damages or
child support... in any action." (Emphasis
added.)
It should be noted that the Brief of Appellant does not cite or
otherwise refer to §78-11-25, U.C.A. which contains the specific
language applicable to the facts of this case.

Here, the plain-

tiff claims that Dr. Nielson was negligent in not informing her
that the tubal ligation procedure for sterilization might not be
absolute in nature and, that as a result of this, she became
pregnant and gave birth to a normal, healthy child.

This claim

falls squarely within the type of claims which are prohibited by
the Act, in that it is based upon an allegation of negligence
which constituted the "failure... to prevent the live birth of a

The Act was passed by the 1983 Utah Legislature and
there are no cases construing the same.

However, the language

of the Act is plain and unambiguous and is not susceptible to

-5-

any interpretation that would allow the instant action to be
maintained.
(1986)

As was set forth in the 3 Utah L.Rev. 483, 491

ff

[w]ith one swoop, the Act abolishes both wrongful birth

and wrongful life as causes of action in Utah".

POINT II
THE BIRTH OF A NORMAL, HEALTHY
CHILD DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO A
"LEGALLY COMPENSABLE DAMAGE"
CLAIM IN TORT
Recently, the Supreme Court of Nevada ruled on the
precise issue before this Court.
Robinson, 715 P.2d

In the case of Szekeres v.

1076 (Nev. 1986) an action was brought in

tort and contract based upon a foiled tubal ligation procedure.
The plaintiff gave birth to a normal baby girl.

The Supreme

Court of Nevada affirmed the District Courtfs order of dismissal
of the tort claim on the ground that one of the essential elements of a tort, namely "legally compensable damages," was not
present.

The Court reasoned as follows:
"...Today this Court decides that in Nevada the birth of a normal child is not a
civil wrong for which the Court will provide a remedy in the form of an action for
damages.
Even if the negligent or careless conduct are found to have contributed
to the eventual birth of Erica, this event
would not give rise to tort liability and
negligence. The reason is that a negli-6-

gence action may not be maintained unless
one has suffered injury or damage, Cannon
v. Sears, Roebuck and Co,, 376 Mass, 3
739, 374 NE.2d 582 (1978) and the birth of
a normal, healthy child is not 'legally
compensable damages1 in tort. Restatement
(Second of Torts, §328A (1965)."
The Nevada Supreme Court continued by quoting from Byrd v. Wesley Medical Center, 237 Kan. 215 699 P.2d 459, 468 (1985), which
held:
"We hold simply that under the public
policy of this state, a parent cannot be
said to be damaged by the birth of a normal, healthy child, and the parent may not
recover because of the birth of such a
child."
Some courts have stated, and take for granted, that giving birth
to a normal child is somehow injurious and damaging; but have
only disagreed on the measure of damages.

In response to this

argument, the Nevada Supreme Court reasoned:
"We do not take the wrongness nor the
injuriousness of the birth event for
granted and say, to the contrary, that
normal birth is not a wrong, it is a
f
rightf. It is an event which, of itself,
is not a legally compensable, injurious
consequence, even if the birth is partially attributable to the negligent conduct
of someone purporting to be able to prevent the eventuality of child birth....Our
refusal to recognize the birth of a normal, healthy child as a compensable wrong
does not in any way interfere with a person's ostensible right to avoid conception
or, per Roe v. Wade, to abort the fetus in
the first trimester.
-7-

Tort liability is part of a body of law
which is directed toward the compensation
of individuals for wrongs suffered within
the scope of their legally recognized
interests and where the law considers the
compensation to be properly (and morally)
required . . .ff
Dr. Nielson submits that the reasoning of the Nevada
and Kansas courts is inherently sound and should be adopted by
this Court.

Other courts which have reached different results

do so only on the incorrect premise that giving birth to a normal, healthy, but unplanned child is a "wrong" for which damages
should be awarded.
The courts which allow a recovery in tort based upon
circumstances similar to those before this Court state that the
issues involved are indistinguishable from any other professional negligence case; for example:
"Analytically, such an action is indistinguishable in an ordinary medical negligence action where plaintiff alleges that
a physician has breached a duty of care
owed to him or her with resulting injurious consequences..." Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 216 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Minn.
1977).
In

response

to

this

argument, the

Nevada

Supreme

Szekeres, supra, stated:
"From our point of view, what is overlooked in these decisions is the basic ques-
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Court in

tion of just what is the damage or the
1
wrong1 to be legally redressed. A case
involving the birth of a normal child is
analytically distinguishable from an ordinary medical negligence action, with its
attendant 'resulting injurious consequences,1 such as death, disability or other
adverse iatrogenic consequences; and it
should not be facilely assumed that child
birth is a fwrongT or the type of injurious consequence for which society should,
through its courts, as a matter of public
policy, get reparation."
Dr. Nielson recognizes that the position taken by the
Nevada and Kansas courts is the minority view.
set forth in Byrd, supra.)

(See the cases

However, the position is logically

sound and embraces the public policy of this State as set forth
in the Wrongful Life Act.

POINT III
THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES SHOULD
NOT INCLUDE THE PROJECTED COSTS
OF REARING AND EDUCATING A
NORMAL AND HEALTHY CHILD
Should this Court hold that a tort claim for the birth
of a normal, healthy child is allowed, it will be necessary to
decide how to measure those damages.

The courts which have

allowed such claims have suggested primarily three views.

In

Byrd, supra, the court thoroughly discussed these three views

-9-

"The first view is that parents may recover only those damages which occur as a
result of pregnancy and birth, and may not
recover the costs of rearing the child.
[Citations omitted.]
The second view
allows parents to recover all damages and
expenses mentioned above, but also includes the costs of rearing a child. This is
often called the ffull damage rule,1 and
has been adopted by a minority of courts.
[Citation omitted.] A third view, sometimes called the ordinary ftort benefit
rule1 allows the recovery of all damages
recovered in the above two views, but
requires a deduction for the benefits that
the parents will receive by virtue of
having a normal, healthy child.
[Citations omitted.]"
The first view is the majority view and has been adopted by
approximately

20 jurisdictions.

In support of the majority

position, the Alabama Court ruled in Boone v. Mullendore, 415
S.2d 718 (Ala. 1982) stated:
"The cornerstone of this denial is the
idea that a normal, healthy life should
not be the basis for a compensable wrong.
To permit the parents to keep their child
and shift the entire cost of its upbringing to the negligent health care provider
would result in a penalty wholly out of
proportion to the culpability involved."
A fundamental concept of our society is that a family that receives a new infant into their home receives much joy and happiness in rearing that child to be an adult.

The joy that the

family receives far outweighs any economic loss that could be
incurred by the parents and family members.
-10-

The Court in Wilber v. Kerr, 277 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d
568 (Ark. 1982) made a persuasive argument supporting the majority position:
"We are persuaded for several reasons to
follow those courts which have declined to
grant damages for the expenses of rearing
a child. It is a question which mettles
with the concept of life and the stability
of the family unit.
Litigation cannot
answer every question.
Every question
cannot be answered in terms of dollars and
cents. We are also convinced that damage
to the child would be significant. That
being an unwanted or 'emotional bastard'
who will someday learn that its parents
did not want it and, in fact, went to
court fo force someone else to pay for its
rearing will be harmful to that child. It
will undermine society's need for a strong
and healthy family relationship.
The second view, or "full damage" rule, has little
support and it appears that only Ohio currently adheres to the
same; see Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St.2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496
(1976).
The third

view, referred

to as the "tort benefits

rule," would result in highly speculative assessments of damages.

This approach would present insurmountable problems of

proof under our present standards of proof of damages.

Proof

could undoubtedly be offered regarding the costs of care and
maintenance of the child, although the standard of living and

-1 1-

the extent of education to be provided such child would undoubtedly

require

considerable

trier of fact.

conjecture

and

speculation

by the

See Troppi v. Scarf 31 Mich. App. 240, 187

N.W.2d 511, 519 (Mich. App. 1971).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Reick v. Medical Protective Co., 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974) succinctly summarized the
reasons that a claim for rearing and educating a normal child
should not be allowed, stating as follows:
"To permit the parents to keep their child
and shift the entire cost of its upbringing to the physician who failed to determine or inform them of the fact of pregnancy would be to create a new category of
surrogate parent.
Every child1s smile,
every bond of love and affection, every
reason for parental pride in a child's
achievements, every contribution by the
child to the welfare and well-being of the
family and parents, is to remain with the
father and mother.
For the most part,
these are intangible benefits, but they
are nontheless real. On the other hand,
every financial cost or detriment—what
the complaint terms 'hard money damages' —
including the cost of food, clothing and
education, would be shifted to the physician who allegedly failed to timely diagnose the fact of pregnancy. We hold that
such result would be wholly out of proportion to the culpability involved, and that
the allowance of recovery would place too
unreasonable a burden upon physicians."

CONCLUSION
The plaintiff's claim is barred by the plain language
of the Wrongful Life Act.

Any attempt to exclude the claim from
-12-

the Act could only be done by ignoring its provisions and would
fly squarely in the face of the public policy of the State.
Additionally, this Court should hold simply that as a matter of
public policy, a parent cannot be said to have sustained "legally compensable damages" as a result of the birth of a normal,
healthy child, and thus no tort claim exists.
Alternatively, should a claim for damages for wrongful
pregnancy be allowed, Utah should not allow compensation for the
costs of rearing and educating a normal, healthy child.
Respectfully submitted this !2> ^> day of May, 1987.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
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ADDENDUM

PHILLIP B. SHELL
DAY & BARNEY
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
45 EAST VINE STREET
MURRAY, UTAH 84107
TELEPHONE: 262-6800
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
CAROL CHAPMAN STRATTON,
Plaintiff,

ORDER OF CERTIFICATION TO
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

—vs—
NORMAN NIELSON, M.D.,
Defendant.

Civil No, 86 C 0235S

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH:
The United States District Court for the District of Utah in
accordance with the provisions of Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure requests that the Utah Supreme Court exercise
its discretion and answer certain questions of Utah law certified
to it:
I.

The questions of law to be answered are as follows:
1 . Does a claim for "wrongful pregnancy" resulting in the
birth of a normal, healthy child as a result of an
unsuccessful sterilization procedure performed by a
physician give rise to a tort claim for damages under
the laws of the State of Utah?
2.

In the event a tort claim for "wrongful pregnancy" is
recognized by the laws of the State of Utah, what is
the appropriate measure of damages?

The questions of law certified as set forth above are
controlling on the issue of liability, and on the issue of
damages in the above entitled case which is pending before
the Court.
There appears to be no controlling Utah law based upon
memoranda of authorities submitted by both parties.
The following facts are relevant to the determination of
the questions of law certified, show the nature of the
controversy, the context in which the questions arose and
the procedural steps by which the questions were framed:
1.

On March 28, 1983, defendant Norman Nielson, M.D. (Dr.
Nielson) performed a tubal ligation procedure (a severance of the fallopian tubes for sterilization) on the
plaintiff.

2.

During November of 1984, the plaintiff became pregnant
and subsequently gave birth to a normal, healthy child
on July 24, 1985.

3.

Plaintiff does not allege that Dr. Nielson was
negligent in the manner in which the surgical procedure
was performed; she alleges that Dr. Nielson was
negligent in not informing her that:
a.

The procedure was not "absolute in nature."

b.

Alternative sterilization procedures were available
(i.e. hysterectomy) with varying success rates.
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Plaintiff asserts the following damage claims:
a.

Medical expenses incurred during plaintiff's
pregnancy and the birth of the child;

b.

Medical expenses incurred in having a hysterectomy
performed subsequent to the birth of the child;

c.

"Emotional trauma" during and after the pregnancy
because of her concerns that the child may inherit
her psychiatric problems;

d.

Pain and suffering; and

e.

Costs of "rearing an unplanned child."

Dr. Nielson filed a motion for summary judgment on the
grounds that the claim for "wrongful pregnancy" as a
result of the birth of a normal, healthy child does not
give rise to a tort claim as one of the essential
elements of the tort, namely legally compensable
damages is not present; alternatively, Dr. Nielson
moved the Court for an order establishing the measure
of damages which would be allowed if the claim for
"wrongful pregnancy" was legally recognized.
The plaintiff resisted the motion for summary judgment
and asserted that the claim of "wrongful pregnancy"
should be recognized by the laws of the State of Utah
and that all of the items of claimed damages set forth
above should be recognized.

-3-

7.

The case was scheduled for trial commencing January 14,
1987; the trial date has been vacated by the Court
pending the action of the Utah Supreme Court on this
Order of Certification.

V.

The Court is of the view that the questions of law presented need to be resolved by the Utah Supreme Court in
order for this Court to be able to enter correct rulings on
the issues of liability and damages.
DATED this zwjday of January, 1987.

BY THE COURT:

(LJL/^L^—
David Sam
United States District Judge

Approved as to form and content
DAY & B. '"^
A t t o r n e y s !fdr P l a i n J ^ r f f

By (\ : / ^ C ^ Q

-yUkJ

/ i P n i l l l p B,. S h e l j ^ y

KIPPA& CHRISTIAN, P . C .
A t t o r n e y s f o r DefendaotBy_
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78-11-23. Right to life — State policy.
The legislature finds and declares that it is the public policy of this state
to encourage all persons to respect the right to life of all other persons,
regardless of age, development, condition or dependency, including all
handicapped persons and all unborn persons.
History: L. 1983, ch. 167, § 1.
Law Reviews. — Utah Legislative Survey
— 1983,1984 Utah L. Rev. 115, 221.

78-11-24. Act or omission preventing abortion not actionable.
A cause of action shall not arise, and damages shall not be awarded, on
behalf of any person, based on the claim that but for the act or omission of
another, a person would not have been permitted to have been born alive
but would have been aborted.
History: L. 1983, ch. 167, § 2.
Law Reviews. — Wrongful Birth and
Wrongful Life: Analysis of the Causes of Ac-

tion and the Impact of Utah's Statutory
Breakwater, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 833.

78-11-25. Failure or refusal to prevent birth not a defense.
The failure or refusal of any person to prevent the live birth of a person
shall not be a defense in any action, and shall not be considered in awarding damages or child support, or imposing a penalty, in any action.

